Grounds to file Petition for Post Conviction Relief Act

In order to assert a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must prove that he was denied “reasonably effective assistance” of counsel by satisfying the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2063-2064 (1984).

Under this test, the Defendant must show (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, meaning that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, meaning that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different; [a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 2068.

“Effective counsel does not mean errorless counsel, but rather counsel whose assistance is ‘[w]ithin the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1449 (1970).

In considering whether trial counsel has met this standard, the court should first determine whether counsel made a “sufficient inquiry into the information that is pertinent to his client’s case.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066). Once such a reasonable inquiry has been made by counsel, the court should consider whether counsel made a reasonable strategy decision on how to proceed with his client’s case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066). Finally, counsel’s strategy decision is a “tactical” decision and will be virtually unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.

In Pennsylvania, the standards for determining claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are well settled. A petitioner is required to demonstrate: 1) that the underlying claim is of arguable merit; 2) that counsel’s action or inaction was not grounded on any reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests; and 3) that but for that error or omission, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have to be different. Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 720 A.2d 79, 88 (Pa. 1998) citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973, (1987); Strickland, supra.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has equated the “no reliable adjudication” language of the P.C.R.A. with the “reasonable probability” language of Strickland, supra. “Where the defendant demonstrates that counsel’s ineffectiveness has created a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, then no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence would have taken place.” Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (Pa. 1999).

Counsel is presumed to effective until the defendant proves otherwise. Commonwealth v. Miller, 494 Pa. 229, 431 A.2d 233 (1981). It is the defendant’s burden to prove all three prongs of the ineffectiveness standard. Commonwealth v. Traviglia, 541 Pa. 108, 661 A.2d 352 (1995).

If it clear that the defendant failed to meet the prejudice prong, the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone without the determination of whether the first and second prongs of the standard have been met. Id., citing Strickland, supra. In order to evaluate whether the defendant was prejudiced, it is necessary to focus on the overall trial strategy and to view the counsel’s performance in toto. Commonwealth v. Saxton, 516 Pa. 196, 532 A.2d 352 (1987). This standard requires not the highest quality of advocacy available, but a certain minimum level of competency. Id.